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Abstract
The notion of stochastic processes with proportional increments is introduced. This notion is of general
interest as indicated by its relationship with several stochastic processes, as counting processes, Le´vy
processes, and others, as well as martingales related with these processes. The focus of this article is on
the motivation to introduce processes with proportional increments, as instigated by certain characteristics
of stopping problems under weak information. We also study some general properties of such processes.
These lead to new insights into the mechanism and characterization of Pascal processes. This again will
motivate the introduction of more general f-increment processes as well as the analysis of their link with
martingales. As a major application we solve the no-information version of the last-arrival problem which
was an open problem. Further applications deal with the impact of proportional increments on modelling
investment problems, with a new proof of the 1/e-law of best choice, and with other optimal stopping
problems.
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1. Introduction and background
In many instances of probabilistic modelling we have to learn from the past what the future is
likely to bring. This fact has found its impact in scientific studies in different forms ranging from
time series in Statistics to stochastic processes and random measures in Probability. Here we start
with a simple weakly specified stochastic process for which the learning aspect is crucial. We
show that this process should have a certain property which we call the proportional increments
property, in short, p.i.-property.
Here is the problem which led us to study proportional increments. Assume that N points
(0 < N <∞) are uniformly and independently distributed on ]0, 1]. We do not know N but we
are allowed to observe ]0, 1], starting from 0, and to keep track of the points we see. Suppose
that somebody stopped us at t with 0 < t < 1 and asked us to predict N . The number of points
we have seen up to time t ∈]0, 1[, Nt say, will influence our estimate of N = N1. However,
one feature stays invariant: each of the remaining points stays uniformly distributed on ]t, 1]
independently of the others because i.i.d. U (]0, 1]) random variables remain conditionally i.i.d.
uniform on any subinterval.
This is trivial, but then, is it of no avail? N is, what it is, and a priori, there is no counting
process (Nt ). This counting process lies in the eyes of the beholder, that is, in our eyes as a
sequential observer. Now, if we had an “optimal” prediction-algorithm for N , then, by symmetry,
we would apply the same one if we had started observation in 1 and were stopped in (1 − t).
Note that observing from left or right with different speeds would also make no real difference
for the problem; in fact, a little reflection shows that no deterministic increasing time change for
the observation speed from either side, nor observing arbitrary Lebesgue-measurable subsets of
]0, 1] of total Lebesgue measure t would change the essence of the problem.
But then, would it not be more appropriate to model the problem by a stochastic process (Nt )
which is already endowed with these characteristics? These were the first reflections which led
us to the notion of proportional increments we will now define. It will prove to be more generally
a versatile and sometimes elegant tool.
1.1. Proportional increments
Definition 1.1. Let (Nt )t>0 be a stochastic process defined on a filtered probability space
(Ω ,F , (Ft ), P) with natural filtration Ft = σ {Nu : u ≤ t}. We say that (Nt )t>0 is a process
with proportional increments on ]0,∞[ if
∀t > 0 with Nt ≠ 0,∀s ≥ 0 : E(Nt+s − Nt |Ft ) = st Nt a.s. (1.1)
Remark. It will be convenient to refer to (1.1) as the p.i.-property of a process (Nt ), or to say
that (Nt ) is a p.i.-process.
Examples. Trivial examples of p.i.-processes are Nt ≡ 0 or Nt = t . In the first example, the
constraint Nt ≠ 0 is never satisfied, in the second one always satisfied. More interesting examples
include, as one can easily check, Nt = c tBt where (Bt ) is a Brownian motion without drift, or
some other zero-mean Le´vy process, and c is a constant. The latter exemplifies a case where the
condition Nt ≠ 0 is of no importance. We put Nt ≠ 0 in the definition because this enlarges the
class of p.i.-processes. For example, counting processes and other monotone processes may then
satisfy (1.1) because its rhs does not vanish for all s ≥ 0.
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Due to the freedom we have by Definition 1.1 there are many possibilities to construct pro-
cesses with proportional increments. Here is an exotic example as a preparation for Section 5.
Imagine a player (player 1) observing the positive half-line with constant speed over the real line
in order to discover points. Player 2 assigns an arbitrary distribution of the first point, T1 > 0, say
and, thereafter, a permanently changing environment of Poisson processes on ]T1,∞[, producing
the following points. Let Nt be the number of points seen up to time t included. To fit the defini-
tion of a p.i.-process, it suffices for player 2 to steadily tune the rate at time t ≥ T1 to Λt = Nt/t.
Other more standard examples will follow in later sections. Definition 1.1 is a preliminary
definition for specific problems. Our motivation goes further, and so this definition will be
generalized in Sections 3 and 4. The goal is a general concept of proportionality in order to span
useful bridges to other processes. We shall see that a generalized notion opens new insights, be it
into the structure of certain processes, or be it for characterizing processes by related martingales.
1.2. Organization of the paper
In Section 2, we shall arrive at Definition 1.1 through the last-arrival problem for which
the no-information case is unsolved. We show that the latter must be modelled by a process
with proportional increments. We then conclude that the problem is equivalent to the problem
of stopping a specific martingale on its last jump. This will be the key to the solution given in
Section 5. We also include a brief comparison with a relevant reverse martingale.
Section 3 starts with elementary properties of p.i.-processes and further motivations. Then a
generalization of Definition 1.1 is introduced by interpreting the proportionality factor s/t as the
odds for a point uniformly chosen in ]0, t + s] to lie in ]t, t + s], that is, with respect to Ft , in the
future. We examine what is gained by this, the answer being that the odds-interpretation can be
an eye-opener. Putting things to work we shed new light on the mechanism of Pascal processes
which play an important role for optimal stopping problems.
In Section 4. we go further by defining what we call f-proportional increments. Whereas
Sections 2 and 3 deal mainly with counting processes, we develop here briefly theoretical
aspects for more general processes. These concern in particular the interplay between stochastic
processes and related martingales.
In Section 5 we use the p.i.-property (1.1) and the odds-algorithm of optimal stopping [6]
to solve the last-arrival problem under the no-information hypothesis (l.a.p.). We also show that
both the model and the solution of the l.a.p. pass the essence of all criteria of Hadamard’s test
for a well-posed problem. We conclude this section by a brief comparison of our results with
Wa¨stlund’s value [21] of the game-version of the problem.
Section 6 advertizes processes with proportional increments as an interesting alternative
and/or new approach to other stopping problems, and also discusses related work. This includes
a new proof of the 1/e-law of best choice [3] as well as examples of the relevance of proportional
increments for certain models such as, for instance, the problem of best choice [11], the online
version of the monotone subsequence problem [7], and investment models.
2. Motivation for p.i.-processes
2.1. The last-arrival problem
Let N > 0 be a positive integer and X1, X2, . . . , X N be independent uniformly distributed
random variables on ]0, 1]. We do not know N but are allowed to observe ]0, 1] continuously,
starting from 0. Our objective is to stop online with exactly one stop on the very last of these
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points, i.e. at their largest order statistics X⟨N ,N ⟩. Does an optimal strategy exist, that is, a strategy
which maximizes the probability of succeeding?
This is the so-called last-arrival problem. We heard it in 2008 from Johan Wa¨stlund who
himself learned it from David Aldous around 2000. Aldous said “he thought this is a very natural
problem” and did not claim being the originator (although he may actually be the originator).
The problem allows for three different interpretations. One is to think of N as being a random
variable with known or partially known prior distribution. Then we may update the information
on N sequentially in the Bayesian sense. Although, depending on the prior information, this may
be a technical challenge, the classical theory of optimal stopping can deal with this.
If we do not suppose a prior distribution on N , then things are different, and two versions,
both much harder, stand out:
In the game version a “devil” chooses N in order to make the observer’s success probability
as small as possible. This game version has been studied by Wa¨stlund [21]. The value is defined
as the success probability of the optimal response of the player confronting the devil using a
devilish-optimal randomization of N . Wa¨stlund uses computational arguments and almost no
probabilistic arguments. His approach may be summarized as finely tuned iterative computations
applied to a structured set of threshold strategies, in each step selecting compatible starting
thresholds which yield an improvement of the value. Wa¨stlund estimated the value of the game
version to be around 0.35291.
Finally, the third version is called the no-information version. It is to this version that we
confine our main concern.
2.2. The no-information version
We say that we are in the no-information case if we know no more about N than being a
positive integer. Does an optimal strategy for stopping on the very last point exist under this
hypothesis? We call the no-information problem the last-arrival problem (the l.a.p.) because we
feel that this is what the originator really meant.
In fact, it is not easy to answer the question whether the l.a.p. has an optimal solution.
Moreover, it is not even evident that it is a well-posed problem. This question has been repeatedly
discussed among peers. Admittedly, a problem of the type “We know nothing but now we have
to act optimally” may sound a priori strange.
Ill-posed or well-posed? Recall that we reserve the name l.a.p. for the problem under the no-
information hypothesis. (Note that this is unlike the game-version which contains information
on N since we know that the devil wants our failure.) In order to prove that the l.a.p. is an ill-
posed problem one would have to show that there exist two assumptions A1 and A2 such that the
following two conditions hold:
(i) A1 and A2 are both completely compatible with the no-information hypothesis.
(ii) If σ1 is an optimal strategy under A1 and σ2 an optimal strategy under A2, then σ1 ≠ σ2.
How could one argue that assumption A1 is different from assumption A2 with both being
compatible with the no-information hypothesis? They would have to be different (somewhere) in
order to have different implications. However, the hypothesis should be understood exactly as it
says: no-information. If we imagine a global space describing all thinkable states of information
about N , then no-information must be seen as a singleton in this space. It is “indivisible”, and we
do not see how such assumptions A1 and A2 may possibly exist. Also, we think that we should
try to solve problems which seem interesting and not to discard them as ill-posed unless they can
be proven to be ill-posed.
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The outcome is that we have found a unique solution. The only “axiom” we assume is: If
models can be proved intractable under the no-information hypothesis, then one is allowed to
discard them. Our point of view is that one should see this as a positive attitude towards applied
Mathematics rather than as an axiom, but we do respect a different point of view.
The indivisibility of the no-information hypothesis has implications for examples and
counterexamples: any argument based on partitioning the “unknown” must be treated with care.
For instance, it is correct, although not deep, to argue “we know nothing about N , hence N may
be anything”. However it is contradictory to argue “so let us suppose for a moment that N is
. . . , and we get a counterexample”. Within a given logical framework, no conclusion within this
framework can be led ad absurdum by an assumption taken from outside, of course.
Our Approach. The no-information hypothesis says that at time 0 we know nothing about the
positive integer N . Nevertheless, we know that all N points are i.i.d U (]0, 1]) random variables
so that partial information about N comes in as soon as we start observing ]0, 1]. Hence nobody
would doubt that there is some possibility of sequential learning. The question is how to make
the best choice of a model of learning rigorous in order to avoid the risk of just dressing intuition
in mathematical terms.
Suppose we could prove that there is only one way of learning to make sense under the no-
information hypothesis. Then the problem is an optimization problem over the set of strategies
made available by the unique learning process. If the choice is not unique the situation is still
the same if in each class of admissible choices the optimal values coincide. We shall argue that
the learning process for the l.a.p. must be modelled by a p.i.-process and that this choice is the
unique tractable model. Let
Nt =
N
k=1
1{Xk≤t}, 0 < t ≤ 1, with N = N1, (2.1)
Ft = σ {Nu, 0 < u ≤ t}. (2.2)
The observer who looks forward from time 0 to time t knows that, looking backwards at time
t, Nt points shall be seen uniformly distributed on ]0, t]. If the observer is at time t (fixed in
advance) then the same is true looking backwards (almost surely, because t may happen to be
a jump time.) Hence the situation is as if (Nu)0<u≤t were a homogeneous Poisson process with
unknown rate on ]0, t]. But, as we argued in the Introduction, the same must hold on ]1− t, 1] for
N−Nt points, and again the same, correspondingly, on any subset of ]0, 1] of Lebesgue measure
t. These features of symmetry and interval exchangeability, together with the no-information
hypothesis, allow for several conclusions listed below.
Conclusion 1. The observer cannot distinguish (Nt )t>0 defined in (2.1) from a homogeneous
Poisson process on ]0, 1] with unknown rate.
Proof. It is well-known that a homogeneous Poisson process has the property that the unordered
arrival times in the past are i.i.d. uniform random variables over the observed interval. Since
this is satisfied by definition of the l.a.p., the observer cannot tell the difference for any history
({X11{X1≤u}, X21{X2≤u} · · · })0<u≤t determining (Nt )without additional information. However,
the uniform distribution of the unordered arrival points (at least one) is the only assumption of
the l.a.p. 
Conclusion 2. To achieve (if possible) optimality the observer must use a one-choice stopping
rule based on a (Ft )-measurable stopping time.
3244 F.T. Bruss, M. Yor / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 122 (2012) 3239–3261
Proof. By definition of the l.a.p., learning is bound to be online, and stopping must be the result
of a non-anticipative rule, hence a stopping time. However, learning is by definition confined
to learning on increasing Borel sets ]0, t]0<t≤1 only on which (Nt ) is (Ft )-measurable (see
(2.2)). Moreover, nothing can be gained for an optimal decision by incomplete observation of
(Nu)0≤u≤t , because ignoring the additional observation time would then yield the same optimum.
Hence complete observation of (Nu)0≤u≤t , (at least until we stop) makes sure that all information
is taken into account. 
Conclusion 3. For finding a solution for the l.a.p., there is only one model which is both
compatible with and tractable for the no-information hypothesis. This is to model the process
(Nt ) as a p.i.-process as defined in (1.1).
Since “tractable” has no well-defined mathematical meaning, we can only justify this
conclusion:
First note that the observer has to take no decision before the first arrival of a point. Since
N > 0 such a point, T1 say, exists and satisfies P(T1 < 1) = 1. We therefore assume throughout
that t ∈ [T1, 1]. According to Conclusion 2, solving the l.a.p. requires modelling the decision
process (Nt ). By the no-information it is contradictory to model (Nt ) by its distributional
prescription because information about N is only provided by sequential observation in time.
Hence the observer is confined to model the process (Nt ) sequentially, or equivalently, by
conditional expected increments E(Nt+s − Nt |Ft ).
Now, for any Lebesgue-measurable L ⊆]0, 1] of measure s we have
E

N
k=1
1{Xk∈L}|N = n

= sn (2.3)
since the X1, X2, . . . , X N are i.i.d uniform on ]0, 1]. This proportionality in the Lebesgue
measure is independent of the location. Now look at the random relative frequency of points
in ]0, t], that is Nt/t . By (2.3) Nt+s/(t + s) and Nt/t have the same expectation, namely N .
But the no-information hypothesis implies that we cannot estimate the distribution of N − Nt/t
by isolated information on N not already contained in Ft . Consequently, inference at time t
must be based on solely on Ft . With the i.i.d. assumption for the Xk’s, Nt contains by definition
all information about N . Hence the only inference on Nt+s compatible with the proportionality
expressed in (2.3) is
E(Nt+s |Ft ) = t + st Nt , T1 ≤ t ≤ t + s ≤ 1. (2.4)
Is it possible to gain something by inferring first from Ft on N? We show that the answer is
No. Nt is a binomial random variable with parameters N and t . Then, given Nt , the remaining
N − Nt points are conditionally i.i.d. uniform random variables on ]t, 1]. If T1 ≤ t ≤ t + s ≤ 1,
then the difference Nt+s−Nt is again binomially distributed with parameters N−Nt and success
probability s/(1− t). Hence
E(Nt+s − Nt |Ft ) = E(N − Nt |Ft ) s1− t . (2.5)
Since the only meaningful inference on N is in the direction from Ft to N , and not vice versa,
and E(Nt/t) = N , (2.5) requires to model E(N |Ft ). The general model is E(N |Ft ) = Nt/t+Yt ,
where Yt is some Ft -measurable error term. Clearly Yt must satisfy Y1 = 0, but also E(Yt ) = 0,
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because otherwise the tower property would imply the contradiction E[E(N |Ft )] ≠ N .However,
with a general term Yt the problem would become circular because we cannot model Yt without
having additional information on N not being contained inFt !Hence the only tractable approach
is now to assume (Yt ) = 0 a.s. This means E(N |Ft ) = Nt/t , and thus we obtain
E(N − Nt |Ft ) s1− t =

Nt
t
− Nt

s
1− t ,
or, from (2.5) equivalently,
E(Nt+s − Nt |Ft ) = st Nt , T1 ≤ t + s ≤ 1. (2.6)
This is again equivalent to (2.4). (We note by the way that in the binomial model, Nt/t is the best
linear unbiased predictor of N . This is not conclusive for uniqueness but a comforting aspect of
optimality.)
It remains to check that this model, i.e. the only remaining tractable model (2.6), is compatible
with both the tower property of conditional expectations and the no-information hypothesis. The
first is true since E[E(Nt+s − Nt |Ft )] = E(Nt+s − Nt ) = s N = E(s Nt/t). For the second, it is
easy to check that (2.4) is equivalent to
E

Nt+s
t + s −
Nt
t
Ft = 0,
which says, together with E(|Nt/t |) = N , that (Nt/t) is a martingale on ]T1, 1]. This implies
that Ft determines the expected increment of Nt+s −Nt without any assumption on N other than
N > 0. 
Conclusion 4. The observer must maximize (provided that this maximum exists) the conditional
probability given Ft of stopping (Nt ) on its last jump time.
Proof. The almost surely strictly increasing order statistics X⟨1,N ⟩ ≤ X⟨2,N ⟩ ≤ · · · ≤ X⟨N ,N ⟩ are
the arrival times of the process (Nt ). We denote them more conveniently T1 ≤ T2 ≤ · · · ≤ TN
by keeping in mind that the distribution of all Tk’s depends on N . We will succeed if and only
if we are prepared to stop at the first occasion strictly (a.s.) after time TN−1, that is to stop on
TN . Note that we have to write the success probability for stopping at time τ as the conditional
expectation given Fτ of the indicator 1{τ=TN } because NTN = N is not Fτ -measurable unless
τ = 1. However, the optimization problem stays equivalent. 
2.3. A related martingale
Here is a result which is only a slight extension of the martingale property observed already
in Conclusion 3 in connection with the no-information hypothesis, but which is of interest on its
own.
Theorem 2.1. Let (Nt )t>0 be a p.i.-process, and let Rt = Nt/t . If E(|Rt |) <∞ then the process
(Rt ) is a (Ft )-martingale on ]0,∞]. Also, if (Nt ) is a counting p.i.-process with Nt0 > 0 and
E(Rt0) <∞ for some t0 > 0 then the condition E(|Rt |) <∞ is fulfilled on ]t0,∞[.
Proof. We first prove the statement for the counting process and show that E(|Rt |) < ∞ for all
t ≥ t0. Indeed, since |Rt | = Rt for a counting process we obtain from Ft ⊇ Ft0
(i) E(|Rt |) = 1t E(Nt0 + (Nt − Nt0))
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≤ 1
t0
E(Nt0)+
1
t
E(Nt − Nt0)
= E(Rt0)+
1
t
E

E

Nt − Nt0 |Ft0

= E(Rt0)+
1
t
E

(t − t0)Nt0t0

< 2E(Rt0) <∞, (2.7)
where the last equality in (2.7) follows from the p.i.-property of (Nt ). To see the martingale
property for t0 < t ≤ T :
(ii) E(Rt+s |Ft ) = 1t + s E (Nt + (Nt+s − Nt )|Ft )
= 1
t + s (Nt + E(Nt+s − Nt |Ft )) =
1
t + s

Nt + st Nt

= Nt
t
= Rt , (2.8)
where we neglected the almost-sure specifications and used the p.i.-property in the third equality
of (2.8).
Second, for general p.i.-processes we have required that E(|Rt |) < ∞ for all t , so that the
proof (i) is redundant under this stronger condition. The proof (ii) of the martingale condition is
independent of this assumption. 
2.4. Le´vy processes and reverse martingales
It is tempting to extrapolate the impact of Conclusion 1 as follows. If we can never make a
distinction in the l.a.p. between the process (Nt ) and a homogeneous Poisson process of unknown
rate, then, since all information stems from Ft = σ {Nu : 0 < u ≤ t ≤ 1} (Conclusion 2) we
might right away suppose that (Nt ) is a homogeneous Poisson process of unknown rate.
This argument is persuasive and finds theoretical support because the i.i.d. uniform
distribution almost characterizes the homogeneous Poisson process (see e.g. Mikosch [16]),
section 2.1.6). However, there is no equivalence. Conclusion 1 does not allow to say more than
(Nt ) must always stay observation-compatible with the assumption that it is a homogeneous
Poisson process with unknown rate.
If the assumption were true then we would have more. Since a homogeneous Poisson process
is a Le´vy process, Proposition 1.3 of Jacod and Protter [15] implies that (Nt/t) is a reverse
martingale with respect to the filtration
F+t = σ {Nu : 1 ≥ u ≥ t}. (2.9)
As already observed by Carr et al. [8] we then have for s < t the equality E(Ns/s|F+t ) = Nt/t
a.s. In terms of our notation for (1.1), namely 0 < t ≤ t + s, this reads E(Nt/t |F+t+s) =
Nt+s/(t + s), or
E(Nt+s − Nt |F+t+s) =
s
t + s Nt+s, t > 0, s ≥ 0. (2.10)
This may be seen as a F+t -version of (1.1). It is very different from (1.1), however, and we point
out again that we do not suppose (Nt ) to be a Poisson process.
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The martingale Theorem 2.1 and the Odds-Theorem of optimal stopping are the main tools
we will use to solve the l.a.p. The solution is postponed to Section 5. so that we can first look at
other forms of the p.i.-property and its connection with martingales.
3. Properties of p.i.-processes and their generalizations
The first examples we have given for p.i.-processes were Nt ≡ 0, Nt = t and Nt = tBt . It
is straightforward to check that Z t = ct (Lt − E(Lt )) is a p.i.-process for any constant c and a
Le´vy process (Lt ). More important, we see that any linear combination of p.i.-processes is again
a p.i.-process.
3.1. Linear combinations
Lemma 3.1. Let (Z (k)t ), k = 1, 2, . . . , n be stochastic processes on ]0,∞[ with the p.i.-property
with respect to a common filtration F˜t . Let Z t = c1 Z (1)t + c2 Z (2)t + · · · + cn Z (n)t , where the ck’s
are arbitrary constants. Then (Z t ) is a p.i.-process on ]0,∞[.
Proof. By definition, all (Z (k)t ), k = 1, 2, . . . , n are F˜t -measurable. Hence the sum process (Z t )
is also F˜t -measurable. Recall also that the constraint in (1.1) (Nt ≠ 0) on p.i.-processes is simply
void in times t such that Z (k)t = 0 or Z t = 0. Hence we have directly from the linearity of the
expectation operator
E(Z t+s − Z t |F˜t ) =
n
k=1
ckE(Z
(k)
t+s − Z (k)t |F˜t )
=
n
k=1
ck
s
t
Z (k)t =
s
t
n
k=1
ck Z
(k)
t =
s
t
Z t ,
so that (Z t ) is a p.i.-process on ]0,∞[ as defined in (1.1) 
If the processes (Z (k)t ) are independent and are known to have the p.i.-property with respect to
filtrations (F (k)t ), respectively, then we may simply choose as common filtration F˜t the filtration
generated by all the (Z (k)t ) together. But independence is clearly far from being necessary to find
a suitable common filtration to endow each (Z (k)t ) with the p.i.-property.
Interest of the p.i.-property. For constructions of p.i.-processes such as, for instance, linear
combinations of zero-mean Le´vy processes, multiplied by the factor t as above, there is of course
no surprise to see that (Z t/t) becomes a martingale under a suitable filtration.
The point we want to make here is that things may be different the other way round. The
martingale (Z t/t) comes, a priori, from the p.i.-property (Theorem 2.1) of (Z t ) and not from a
construction based on specific processes or martingales. The factor t , visible in constructions as
above, may well be hidden in distributional descriptions of stochastic processes. Or else, it may
appear only via a time transformation as exemplified in the next subsection. Therefore we think
that the p.i.-property has interesting unifying aspects. Admittedly, only time can tell whether it
will prove to be generally useful.
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3.2. Odds-proportionality
The idea of using time or measure transformations comes now naturally, in particular if we
think again of what we have learned from the l.a.p.: observing ]0, 1] in continuously varying
speed would lead in general to a change of the uniform pattern in time, but not change the
essence of the problem. Indeed, the following will show that the concept of proportionality can
be extended to classes of processes whose structure seems quite different from the examples seen
before.
In Definition 1.1 the ratio s/t is that of the corresponding interval lengths of the future interval
]t, t + s] and the past ]0, t]. We may see s/t as the odds of the event that a uniform random
variable on ]0, t+ s] falls into ]t, t+ s]. Thinking for a moment solely of this odds-interpretation
and seeing the concept of proportional increments in (1.1) as a special case of odds-proportional
increments raises two natural questions:
Q1: Are there continuous-time stochastic processes with more general odds-proportional
increments?
Q2: If the answer to Q1 is affirmative, can we then, as in Theorem 2.1, find a martingale by
just using the corresponding 1/P(success in the past) as the compensator?
Interestingly, the answer is affirmative for both questions as we exemplify by the class of Pascal
processes.
3.3. Pascal processes
Pascal processes [4] are counting processes having the following property: If we mark the
arrival times in a Pascal process (Πt )t≥0 successively by i.i.d. random variables randomized
from a continuous distribution then the resulting point process of k-record times is (from the kth
arrival time onwards) a Poisson process (in general inhomogeneous). Hence k-record times have
independent increments so that no Bayesian sequential updating is required for most stopping
problems with objective functions based on relative ranks. This is why Pascal processes are
gimmicks for optimal choice problems based on ranks.
Their utility is greatly enhanced by the following: Every Pascal process can be transformed
by a deterministic time change into a “standard Pascal” process, and every strictly increasing
deterministic time change of a standard Pascal process is again a Pascal process ([4], Lemma 1).
The name Pascal process refers to the central role played by the negative binomial distribution
(Pascal distribution). For convenience we recall the definition:
Definition 3.1. Let (Πt )t≥0 be a counting process with the distributional prescription that for all
T > 0 and 0 < t ≤ T
P(ΠT = n|Ft ) =

n
Πt

p(t, T )Πt+1(1− p(t, T ))n−Πt , (3.1)
where Π0 = 0 and (Ft ) = σ({Πu : u ≤ t}). Then (Πt ) is called a Pascal process with parameter
function p(t, T ).
It follows from (3.1) that the parameter function is supposed to satisfy p(t, t) = 1 and
0 ≤ p(t, T ) ≤ 1 for all 0 ≤ t < T . We also see from (3.1) that P(ΠT = Πt |Ft ) = p(t, T )Πt+1,
i.e. p(t, T ) is the probability of a success (arrival) in ]0, t] given that it arrives in ]0, T ]. Hence the
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conditional probability for a success in the future part ]t, T ] equals q(t, T ) := 1 − p(t, T ) so
that the corresponding odds for this event are
r(t, T ) := q(t, T )
p(t, T )
. (3.2)
Moreover, from (3.1), P(ΠT = n|Ft ) can be interpreted as the probability that the (Πt + 1)th
success of a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials occurs at the (n + 1)th trial, that is, ΠT
counts the number of trials before this last success. Therefore (Πt + 1) is a candidate for odds-
proportionality.
Theorem 3.1. Every Pascal process (Πt ) augmented by 1 has odds-proportional increments with
odds r(t, T ) := (1 − p(t, T ))/p(t, T ), where p(t, T ) is the corresponding parameter function,
that is
E(ΠT −Πt |Ft ) = r(t, T )(Πt + 1) a.s.
Proof. Let (Π˜t ) = (Πt + 1). Then, since E(Π˜T − Π˜t |Ft ) = E(ΠT − Πt |Ft ), we have to show
that
E(Π˜T − Π˜t |Ft ) = r(t, T )Π˜t a.s. (3.3)
Since ΠT counts, as explained above, the number of events before the (Πt + 1)th success in
independent trials with success probability p(t, T ) each, the random variable ΠT + 1 can be
seen as the sum of Πt + 1 independent geometric variables with parameter p(t, T ). Therefore
E(ΠT |Ft ) = Πt + 1p(t, T ) − 1 a.s., 0 < t ≤ T, (3.4)
so that with Π˜t = Πt + 1 we obtain E(Π˜T |Ft ) = Π˜t/p(t, T ) a.s.
This implies
E(Π˜T − Π˜t |Ft ) = −Π˜t + Π˜tp(t, T ) = r(t, T )Π˜t (3.5)
= r(t, T )(Πt + 1) a.s., 0 < t ≤ T, (3.6)
and the theorem is proved. 
3.4. Martingales by analogy
The following theorem yields the corresponding (Ft )-martingale. Before we prove the result
we make it intuitive by a direct analogy to what we have done to obtain Theorem 2.1.
We have seen the factor s/t in (1.1) as the odds defined by the Lebesgue measures of the
future against the past. Now we have more general odds q(t, T )/p(t, T ), that is, more general
measures. We only must pay attention to the right definition of the odds. For a Pascal process
the definition of the odds stems from the Pascal distribution for ΠT with T ≥ t . The success
probability interpretation of p(t, T ) holds for the (Πt+1)th success and not for theΠt th success.
Hence Πt + 1 is the candidate for odds-proportionality. But then the form of proportionality is
the same and the normalizing factor to turn (Πt + 1)t>0 into a martingale should now be p(t, T )
in accordance with this analogy. Indeed, we have the following.
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Theorem 3.2. If (Πt )t≥0 is a Pascal process with parameter function p(t, T ) and filtration
Ft = σ({Πu : 0 ≤ u ≤ t}), then the process (Rt )t>0 defined by
Rt = Πt + 1p(t, T ) (3.7)
is a (Ft )-martingale on ]0, T ].
Proof. We first show that E[|Rt |] <∞ for all 0 < t ≤ T . We have Πt + 1 ≥ Π0 + 1 > 0 and,
by definition of the parameter function, 0 < p(t, T ) ≤ 1 for all 0 < t < T . Therefore the odds
r(t, T ) are bounded for all t > 0. Odds-proportionality and Π0 + 1 = 1 in Theorem 3.1 imply
then E(Rt ) = E(|Rt |) <∞ for all t ∈]0, T ].
To see the martingale property, we first prove that
∀ 0 < t ≤ T : E(RT |Ft ) = Rt a.s. (3.8)
From the definition of Rt and again the odds-proportionality of Πt + 1 we obtain from (3.7)
E(RT |Ft ) = E(Rt + (RT − Rt )|Ft )
= Rt + E

ΠT + 1− Πt + 1p(t, T )
Ft (since p(T, T ) = 1)
= Rt − Πt + 1p(t, T ) +

Πt + 1
p(t, T )
− 1

+ 1 (from (3.4))
= Rt a.s.
The martingale property for all intermediate points t < u < T follows then from (3.8) and the
tower property of conditional expectations since
E(Ru |Ft ) = E
−(RT − Ru)+ (RT − Rt )+ Rt |Ft 
= Rt − E(RT − Ru |Ft ) (from (3.8))
= Rt − E

E(RT − Ru |Fu)|Ft

(since Fu ⊇ Ft )
= Rt a.s.,
where the last equality follows again from (3.8) and E(0|Ft ) = 0. Hence the theorem. 
The article [4] characterized Pascal processes. We can now add: Pascal processes are
stochastic processes with odds-proportional increments.
4. f-proportional increments
We briefly indicate here a further generalization of proportional increments in order to show
the tractability of the notion. (This is part of work in progress.)
For any function f :]0,∞[→]0,∞[ let the process (N ( f )t )t>0 be defined by
Nt = f (t)N ( f )t , (4.1)
or, since f () > 0, equivalently, N ft = Nt/ f (t). As before, let Ft denote the σ -field generated
by {Ns : 0 < s ≤ t}.
It is straightforward to check from (4.1) the following identity:
E (Nt − Ns |Fs) = f (t) E

N ( f )t − N ( f )s |Fs

+ f (t)− f (s)
f (s)
Ns . (4.2)
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In the second term on the rhs of (4.2) we see Ns multiplied to ( f (t)− f (s))/ f (s), which reminds
us of the analogy we used in Section 3 to find related martingales for Pascal processes. Using the
preceding identity the following Theorem is easy to prove.
Theorem 4.1. The following statements (i) and (ii) are equivalent:
(i) ∀s > 0 with Ns ≠ 0 : E (Nt − Ns |Fs) = f (t)− f (s)f (s) Ns, for s < t ,
(ii) (N ( f )t )t>0 is a Ft -martingale.
Motivated by the definition of N ( f )t in (4.1) and Theorem 4.1 we define the following.
Definition 4.1. Let (Nt )t>0 be a stochastic process with natural filtration (Ft )t>0. We say that
(Nt )t>0 is a f-increment process for a given function f :]0,∞[→]0,∞[, if N ( f )t := Nt/ f (t)
satisfies one of the two (i.e. both) equivalent conditions (i) and (ii).
Under a slightly stronger condition we can say more. Suppose now that f ∈ C1(]0,∞[) and
that
∀T > 0 : sup
0<t≤T
E(Nt ) <∞. (4.3)
Then we have the following.
Theorem 4.2. The following properties are equivalent:
(a) (Nt ) is a f-increment process,
(b) ∀ϵ > 0: The process (Mt )t>ϵ defined by
Mt = Nt −
 t
ϵ
ds
f ′(s)
f (s)
Ns
is a (Ft )t>ϵ-martingale.
We do not prove this result at this place but indicate it to exemplify the potential of a generalized
notion of proportional increments.
Let us now turn to the main application in this paper, that is, to show our solution of the l.a.p.
5. Solution of the last-arrival problem
Since we have no information on N , the l.a.p. has no value. Therefore optimality is
sequentially defined according to decisions implied by the optimality principle: We should go
on in a jump time t of (Nu) if, given Ft , there is a strategy which stops with a higher conditional
win probability later on, and we should stop in t , if not.
Recall Conclusion 4 and Theorem 2.1 of Section 2. Note that the jump times of (Nt ) and
(Nt/t) are exactly the same on ]0, 1]. As N > 0, a first jump time T1 = X⟨1,N ⟩ always exists,
and no decision is required before.
Hence we can confine our interest to the process (Nt )T1≤t≤1. From Theorem 2.1 we now
know that (Nt/t) is a (Ft )-martingale on ]T1, 1]. Accordingly, the observer’s goal is to stop on
the last jump time of this martingale, and we recall that this last jump time is not Ft -measurable
unless t = 1. Now, a (Ft )-martingale stopped by a (Ft )-measurable stopping time is also a (Ft )-
martingale. Since a stopping rule which does not lead to a stop strictly before time 1 (and hence
misses the last point almost surely) is sub-optimal, the observer can restrict interest to stopping
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times τ with 0 < τ < 1. This means also that a possibly optimal strategy must be prepared to
give up observing the process (Nt ) at some time strictly before time 1.
The idea is now to combine the constraints from the Conclusions of Section 2.2 with
Theorem 2.1 and the objective, that is: (i) The process (Nt ) must stay at any time t indistinguish-
able from a homogeneous Poisson process with unknown rate (hence also after a (Ft )-stopping
time τ < 1); (ii) (Nt ) is the only relevant decision process; (iii) (Nt/t) is a martingale as soon
as a decision is required; (iv) the optimal stopping time τ maximizes the conditional probability
of being the last jump time of (Nt ).
The following lemma concerns the objective to stop a counting process on its last jump. It
is based on the odds-algorithm of optimal stopping [6] and can be slightly generalized, but we
tailor it here for the l.a.p.
Lemma 5.1. Let (Yu) be a counting process on ]0, T ] defined on a filtered probability space
(Ω ,G, (Gt )t>0, P). Suppose that for some 0 < s < T , (Yu)u≥s is a Poisson process with rate
ρu possibly depending on Gv for v ≤ s. Let Ss be the set of (Gt )-stopping times with values in
[s, T ], and let
σ = inf

J : J is a jump time of (Yt )t≥s with
 T
J
ρudu ≤ 1

. (5.1)
Then, within the class Ss , σ is optimal for stopping Yu on its last jump time. Moreover, if T
s ρudu ≥ 1 then σ is also globally optimal.
Proof. Refer to page 1389, subsection 4.1, in [6]) and to the optimal stopping time for stopping
on a last success as defined in (7) on the same page. Since in Lemma 5.1 every arrival point is
considered as being a “success” in the sense of [6] we put there h(u) ≡ 1. Now note that the
optimal τ defined in (7) can also be written in the form
τ = inf

0 ≤ t ≤ T :
 T
t
λ(u)du ≤ 1

,
where the possible value τ = inf{∅} = ∞ is interpreted as not stopping on ]0, 1[, which means
“τ = 1” for the l.a.p. According to the assumptions in Lemma 5.1 put λ(u) in (4.1) equal to ρu
for all u ∈ [s, T ]. The optimal stopping time confined to jump times in Ss is correspondingly
τ (s) = inf

s ≤ J ≤ T : J is a jump time with
 T
J
ρudu ≤ 1

(5.2)
as in (5.1). Finally, optimality within the class Ss need not imply global optimality because it
may have been optimal to stop before time s. However, missing the last arrival from s onwards is
always suboptimal. If
 T
s ρudu ≥ 1 holds, then the optimal stopping time cannot be smaller than
s, however, so that, under this condition, optimality within Ss extends to global optimality. 
5.1. The optimal strategy for the l.a.p.
Theorem 5.1. Let Tk = X⟨k,N ⟩, k = 1, 2, . . . , N , i.e. the Tk are the a.s. increasing jump times
of (Nt ). Further let
τ = inf

Tk ∈]0, 1] : k ≤ Tk1− Tk

, (5.3)
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with τ being defined to equal 1 if the set on the rhs of (5.3) is empty. Then τ is the unique optimal
stopping time for the last-arrival problem.
Proof. We first prove that τ defined in (5.3) is a (Ft )-stopping time. Let T0 := 0, and let Jt
denotes the event that t is a jump time of (Nu)0<u<1. For a jump time t with 0 < t < 1 we can
write
{TNt−1 < τ ≤ t} = Jt ∩

Nt ≤ t1− t

∩
Nt−1
j=1

T j
1− T j < j

, (5.4)
where the very last intersection part is understood to be Ω if Nt = 1. If the event (5.4) lies in Ft
then {τ ≤ t} lies also in Ft . Indeed, {τ ≤ t} can be written as the union of Nt sub-events of the
same form as in (5.4). Hence each of these lies in a corresponding σ -field Fu for u ≤ t so that
Fu ⊆ Ft .
It remains to show {TNt−1 < τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft . The terms Jt and {Nt ≤ t1−t } in (5.4) are clearly inFt . This covers directly the case Nt = 1, so let Nt > 1. In the last term of Nt − 1 intersections
in (5.4) we have the events
T j
1− T j < j

=

T j <
j
j + 1

=

N j/( j+1) ≥ j

which are in F j/( j+1), respectively. But for Nt > 1 and j = 1, 2, . . . , Nt − 1, we see that
( j/( j + 1)) ↑ (Nt − 1)/Nt ≤ Nt/(Nt + 1) ≤ t,
where the last inequality follows from (5.2) because t is the first jump time after TNt−1, so that
τ = t = TNt . This implies for j = 1, 2, . . . , Nt − 1,
F j/( j+1) ⊆ F(Nt−1)/Nt ⊆ Ft .
Hence all events on the rhs of (5.2) are in Ft and, as we have reasoned already by the union of
these events, this implies {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft for 0 < t < 1. Similarly, we get {τ ≤ 1} ∈ F1 because
N1 = N , so that from (5.2)
{τ = 1} =
N
j=1

T j
1− T j < j

∈ F1.
This proves that τ is a (Ft )-stopping time.
Second, let τ be an arbitrary (Ft )-stopping time on [T1, 1], where T1 > 0 a.s. Then τ ∧ t
is also a (Ft )-stopping time on [T1, 1]. Define a new process which coincides with the stopped
process (Nt∧τ ) on ]0, τ ] and satisfies Conclusion 1 of Section 2 on ]τ, 1] that is,
Mτt = 1{t≤τ }Nt + 1{t>τ }

Nτ + µt−τ (Λτ )

, (5.5)
where (µu(Λτ ))u≥0 is a Poisson process with unknown rate Λτ and µ0(Λτ ) = 0. Then, requiring
that (Mτt /t) maintains the martingale property of the learning process (Nt/t) implies for t > τ
the necessary condition
E

Mτt
t
Fτ = Nτt + Λτ (t − τ)t = Mτττ = Nττ a.s. (5.6)
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It is easy to check that the only rate Λτ satisfying this condition is the random rate Λτ = Nτ /τ ,
that is,
Mτt
t

is a (Ft )−martingale H⇒ Λτ := Nτ
τ
. (5.7)
We call the Poisson process part of (5.5) for the choice of the rate shown in (5.7) the Poisson
shadow of (Nt ) on ]τ, 1].
Now, the observer succeeds in getting the last point with the stopping time τ if and only if
Nτ = N , that is, if and only if the Poisson shadow of (Nt ) has no further jumps on ]τ, 1]. This
is now a well-defined stopping problem because conditioned on τ = t we have well-defined
conditional probabilities of no further jumps on ]t, 1].
We now use the odds-algorithm of optimal stopping to determine the optimal strategy. Since
time is continuous we want to use its continuous time integral version as described in Eq. (7) in
subsection 4.1 of [6] and adapted for our needs in Lemma 5.1. We choose the horizon T to be 1.
Consider the consecutive jump times T1, T2, . . . of (Nt )0<t<1. For each jump time t ∈
{T1, T2, . . .}, let
(Y (t)u ) = M tu, t ≤ u ≤ 1, (5.8)
with M tu as defined in (5.5). Then each (Y
(t)
u ) satisfies the hypotheses of the process (Y ) defined
in Lemma 5.1, each having its own Poisson shadow on [t, 1] with the corresponding rate ρ(t)u ,
say. From the martingale condition in (5.6) for M tu we know that E(
M tu
u |Ft ) = Nt/t , so that (M tu)
has the constant Poisson shadow rate ρ(t)u = Nt/t . It follows that 1
t
ρ(t)u du =
 1
t
du E

M tu
u
Ft = Nt 1− tt a.s. (5.9)
We will now show that the observer must optimize his decision to stop or continue according to
the advice of the corresponding Poisson shadow.
Indeed, putting s = t in Lemma 5.1 yields: It is optimal to stop on a jump time J = t if 1
t ρudu ≤ 1, but it would be strictly suboptimal to stop if
 1
t ρudu > 1, because then optimal
behaviour on ]0, 1] necessitates optimality on St .
Hence, in order to maximize the probability to stop on the last jump of (Nt ) it is, according to
(5.9), optimal to act in each jump time t as follows:
Nt
1− t
t
> 1 H⇒ continue observation (5.10)
Nt
1− t
t
≤ 1 H⇒ stop. (5.11)
This means that it is optimal to stop on a jump time t if and only if
Nt
t
(1− t) ≤ 1, (5.12)
or equivalently, if and only if an arrival time Tk and its index satisfy
k ≤ Tk
1− Tk , (k = NTk ). (5.13)
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If we do not stop before time 1 because no such index k exists we consequently have to stop
in 1. Since this is exactly the stopping time τ we defined in (5.3), and it is unique, the proof is
complete. 
Remark. This proof has, as we think, new features. We used no monotone-case argument
(although it is intrinsic in the Odds-Theorem) and no excessive functions for Markov processes
(see e.g. [2], p.137). We could not use these because we had to ride a fine line on making the
distinction between a process which looks like a homogeneous Poisson process, and really having
such a process. Learning is based on the unknown process (Nt ) only but each decision is based
on the martingale property of (Nt/t), where the Poisson process plug-in in (5.5) is compulsory
by Conclusion 1.
It is interesting to see the reward of rigour. It is known that a Poisson process overestimates its
rate in jump times. Hence, if we used a Poisson process from the beginning we would naturally
use unbiased estimates for its rate and thus modify them in jump times. As the proof shows, we
must not do so! Unbiasedness is an intuitively relevant factor, but no more. The p.i.-property of
(Nt ) implies the martingale property of (Nt/t), and it is the martingale property alone that is
conclusive.
5.2. Evaluation of the optimal strategy for the l.a.p.
We now evaluate the performance of the optimal strategy which depends, of course, on N .
Hence we cannot assign a value to the optimal strategy but only evaluate it conditioned on N .
Theorem 5.2. If N = n then the optimal win probability for the l.a.p. equals
wn = n!
 1/2
0
 2/3
x1
 3/4
x2
· · ·
 (n−1)/n
xn−2
 1
n/(n+1)
dxn dxn−1 . . . dx2dx1. (5.14)
Proof. Let k be an integer with 1 ≤ k ≤ n. By definition of τ in (5.3) we have
{τ = T1} =

T1
1− T1 ≥ 1

=

T1 ≥ 12

,
and for k = 2, 3, . . . , n
{τ = Tk} =

T1
1− T1 < 1,
T2
1− T2 < 2, . . . ,
Tk−1
1− Tk−1 < k − 1

∩

Tk
1− Tk ≥ k

=

T1 <
1
2
, T2 <
2
3
, . . . , Tk−1 <
k − 1
k
, Tk ≥ kk + 1

.
The observer wins if and only if {τ = TN } occurs. Hence, given N = n, the optimal win
probability equals
wn = P

T1 <
1
2
, T2 <
2
3
, . . . , Tn−1 <
n − 1
n
, Tn ≥ nn + 1
N = n . (5.15)
Since the Tk are increasing order statistics of the X j ’s the inequalities T1 < T2 < · · · are satisfied
by definition. Therefore wn is the multiple integral of the joint density of all n order statistics
over the bounds given in (5.15). Since this joint density of order statistics of i.i.d. U ]0, 1] random
variables is n! on ]0, 1]n , we obtain (5.14), and thus the theorem is proved. 
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Theorem 5.3. (i) wn is maximum for n = 1 with w1 = 12 .
(ii) wn ≤ 1/e, ∀n ≥ 2.
(iii) limn→∞wn = 1/e.
Proof. To see that (i) holds we first note that wn decreases for n = 1, 2, 3, namely from (5.14),
w1 = 1/2; w2 = 1/3; w3 = 3!
 1/2
0
 2/3
x1
 1
3/4
dx3dx2dx1 = 5/16.
(From n = 3 onwards the values wn in (5.14) seem to be increasing. We have checked this by
Mathematica up to n = 25, with w25 = .36066..).
To prove that 1/2 is the maximum value, it suffices to show (ii), that is, (wn) is bounded for
n ≥ 2 by 1/e. This follows from (5.15) and the upper bound
wn ≤ un := P

Tn−1 ≤ n − 1n , Tn >
n
n + 1
N = n , n ≥ 2.
Since {Tn−1 ≤ n−1n , Tn > nn+1 } is the event, that exactly one point falls into ]n/(n + 1), 1] and
all others into ]0, (n − 1)/n] we have by independence
un = P

Tn−1 ≤ n − 1n , Tn >
n
n + 1
N = n = n 1− 1n
n−1 1
n + 1 ↑ 1/e,
where the monotone increasing convergence to 1/e follows from un/un+1 ≤ 1. This proves (ii)
and completes the proof of (i). For a nice proof of (iii), limn wn = 1/e, we refer to Dendievel
([9], pp. 111–113). (See however also the conjecture below.) 
Conjecture. We conjecture something stronger, namely that (wn)n≥3 is itself monotone
increasing to 1/e. We have not been able to prove this, and the problem has been discussed
in many places. We would be grateful if a successful reader would contact us.
5.3. Hadamard’s criteria
As indicated in Section 2 there were discussions among peers whether the l.a.p. is a well-
posed problem. Our conclusion is a clear “yes”. If we cannot attribute a value to it but only a
reasonable range of values depending on what N actually is, this lies in the nature of the problem.
The solution is an optimal strategy without value, but it is unique. Let us submit our solution to
an independent test.
The commonly accepted criteria, due to Hadamard [12], are that a well-posed problem should
satisfy the following:
1. a solution exists;
2. the solution is unique;
3. the solution is continuous on the data in some reasonable topology.
To test Hadamard’s criteria, we summarize our approach: Concentrating on the property
of i.i.d. U [0, 1]-uniform random variables and their conditional i.i.d. behaviour for arbitrary
Lebesgue-measurable subintervals of ]0, 1] we arrived at four conclusions. They implied that
the uniquely decision-relevant process (Nt ) must have the p.i.-property, and this again led via the
martingale property of (Nt/t) and the odds-algorithm of optimal stopping to the unique solution
given in Theorem 5.1. Therefore the criteria 1 and 2 are satisfied.
The criterion 3 is here subtle. There are no data. Is it possible to define a suitable topology
for “no information on N” being the limit of a sequence of open sets containing information
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on N without specifying a model which contains information? The intricacy of this question is
exemplified below by a non-informative (improper) Laplace prior distribution on N .
Before this we recall that Hadamard was well aware of possible intrinsic difficulties to check
his criteria, and careful to speak of criteria instead of necessary conditions. Concerning criterion
3, his discussions admit an alternative: an algorithm yielding the solution should stay computable
and continuous in the data as long as those are compatible with the model. As we shall see below,
our result does stay compatible in the only reasonable comparison we found.
To exemplify that it may be impossible to find a natural topology to host no-information as a
limit, suppose that we know an upper bound u ∈ N for N . In the sense of Shannon entropy, the
least informative case is to suppose that N is a uniform random variable on {1, 2, . . . , u}. Hence
we enter the distribution case. The limiting least informative case is obtained by letting u →∞,
reducing the information on specific values of N indeed to zero. However N is then modelled as
being arbitrarily large with a probability arbitrarily close to one. Seen globally, this is far from
being non-informative!
Nevertheless, this limit model stays compatible with our model and solution. Indeed, one can
check that the improper Laplace prior yields a Pascal distributed posterior distribution P(NT |Ft )
so that (Nt ) is a Pascal process. One can check that the odds turn out to be (T − t)/t . But this is
then (see (3.1) and (3.2)) exactly the same as our original p.i.-process (Nt ).
So far for the model, but, having now more information on N , what about its impact on the
value? With the limiting Laplace prior on N (uniform on {1, 2, . . . , u} with u → ∞) we get
P(N > n) → 1 for all fixed n. Thus Theorem 5.3(iii) implies that the success probability
is now 1/e, i.e. it assumes the upper success probability bound for no information. Hence, in a
“topology” where the no-information singleton is seen as the limit of a non-informative improper
prior, Hadamard’s criterion 3 is also satisfied.
5.4. Comparison with the game-version
Recall from Section 2.1 the game version of the last arrival problem studied by Wa¨stlund [21]
with a value of about 0.35291. If we look at our results on the case of no-information
(Theorem 5.3), we see the conditional win probability given N = n in the range between 0.3125
and 1/e = 0.3678 . . ., except for n = 1.
Looking at a few small and a few larger values of n a game value between 0.35 and 0.36, say,
seems intuitive. Indeed, the devil would like to choose N small in order to profit from the smaller
values we have seen in the proof of Theorem 5.3. However, after having observed [0, 1/2], (note
that the optimal strategy in the l.a.p. never stops before 1/2) we would, knowing that we play
against a devil, definitely become suspicious and improve our chances for small N . But then the
devil would neither like to choose large N with a larger probability because (see Theorem 5.3(iii))
this would push the value towards 1/e = 0.3678 . . . .
As Wa¨stlund showed already, the devil cannot risk to choose N too small, and not too large
either; he must randomize, and the distribution of N must have no bounded support. It is an
interesting question to know whether Wa¨stlund’s devil strategy to choose a randomization of N
minimizes the win probability of the optimal l.a.p. strategy. To confirm this one would have to
check with sufficient computational precision that
∞
n=1
wn PD(N = n) = 0.35291 . . . , (5.16)
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where PD denotes the devilish-optimal distribution, andwn the conditional win probability given
N = n. This should be the case, but the verification is not easy because {PD(N = n)}n=1,2,...
is not explicit in Wa¨stlund’s paper, and also, the wn in (5.14) seems difficult to compute for
larger n.
6. Related work and further applications for p.i.-processes
6.1. P.i.-property and odds-algorithm
We have solved the l.a.p. for the (original) objective of win or lose according to stopping
at the last point using the odds-algorithm [6]. Meanwhile new work has been published on the
odds-algorithm as e.g. in Hsiau and Yang [14], Ferguson [10], Ano et al. [1], and Tamaki [20].
The version of Ferguson can be used to solve a modification of the l.a.p. in which the observer
receives different rewards for stopping on the last, stopping at another than the last and/or a
penalty for not stopping at all.
The usefulness of the p.i.-property in stopping problems seems however quite independent of
the odds-algorithm and stopping problems. Actually, we think of the p.i.-property mainly as a
modelling tool, as indicated below.
6.2. P.i.-property as a modelling tool
One purpose of the p.i.-property is to pass from well-defined informative models to models
with much less information. So for example it makes perfect sense to reconsider the work of
Bruss and Rogers [5], Samuel-Cahn [17], Gnedin [11], and others under this aspect for problems
relating to best-choice. The same can also be of interest for other stopping problems with
completely different objectives, as e.g. for the online-version of the continuous-time monotone
subsequence problem (Bruss and Delbaen [7]). We should add here that these are suggestions
and that we have not gone through details.
A second purpose is to gain simplicity by looking for ways to “create” the p.i.-property by
adapting the model. Indeed, it is sometimes surprising to see how much simpler a solution may
can become by slightly changing the model. Here is an example.
6.3. A simple investment problem
Suppose that a client (she) asks us to model an investment problem on a random stream of
investment opportunities with random (quality) marks. Arriving opportunities are seen as points
of a counting process (Ct )0≤t≤T on some fixed horizon [0, T ]. Her goal is to maximize some
objective function based on the relative ranks of the marks. Moreover she suggests to model (Ct )
as a Poisson process with rate λ of value “around 3”. Asking how confident she feels about “3”
we find out that she thinks “something like 3” in a sense of average but would not risk to say
more. Now, modelling the rate λ by a random variable as for example uniform, or β-distributed,
on ]0, 6[, say, leads to a complicated optimal strategy, and even a fixed λ may do so.
Modelling λ as an exponentially distributed random variable (λ ∼ Exp(3), say) does the
trick, however. Now (Ct ) becomes an odds-proportional process (Pascal process) and thus the
point processes collecting the same relative ranks are Poisson processes. Hence one can get with
little work closed-form solutions. Also, it need not only be the simpler solution which counts;
clients may be more comfortable themselves with a more flexible hypothesis. (For a related game
F.T. Bruss, M. Yor / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 122 (2012) 3239–3261 3259
version see Szajowski [19]; see Hsiau [13] for possible extensions to consecutive relative best
investments.)
As a last example we look at an older problem with an open question.
6.4. 1/e-law of best choice
An unknown number N of uniquely rankable candidates for a position are supposed to
arrive on [0, T ] with i.i.d. arrival times according to a continuous distribution function F .
Each candidate is thought of as being equally likely the best, second best etc., so that the kth
arriving candidate is a record (best so far) with probability 1/k, k = 1, 2, . . . , n. This model was
proposed in [3] to give a satisfactory answer for the secretary problem with an unknown number
of candidates where the goal is to select the best candidate.
The 1/e-law ([3], pp. 883–885) says: Let σt be the strategy to wait until time t and then to
select (if possible) the first record candidate thereafter, and let
t∗ = inf{t : F(t) = 1/e.} (6.1)
Then, first, σt∗ succeeds with probability at least 1/e for all N ≥ 1. Second, this lower bound
is sharp and no other strategy can do uniformly better. Also, the probability of σt∗ selecting no
candidate is exactly 1− 1/e.
The 1/e-law came as a surprise because the value 1/e was believed out of reach for an
unknown number of candidates [18]. The original proof was by combinatorial arguments. We
give now a more elegant proof based on the p.i.-property. Note that we have no information on
N and can apply F to the arrival times to get i.i.d. U ([0, 1]) arrival times. Like in the l.a.p. we
conclude that (Nt ) has to be modelled by the p.i.-property. The only difference is that we want
to stop now on the last record (i.e. rank 1) and not on the last arrival.
Proof. (1/e-law of best choice): Let σt as before. Given (Nu) jumps in s the probability of the
arrival at time s being a record is 1/Ns independently of others. Hence with the p.i.-property of
(Nu), the Ft -conditional intensity of the record process is
E

Nt
t
Ns
−1|Ft

, 0 < t ≤ s ≤ 1.
Thus we should stop on a record from t onwards (compare with (5.9)) if 1
t
E

Nt
t
1
Ns
Ft ds = Ntt
 1
t
E

1
Ns
Ft ds ≤ 1. (6.2)
By Jensen’s inequality and the p.i.-property we should stop in particular if
Nt
t
 1
t
1
E(Ns |Ft )ds =
Nt
t
 1
t
t
s Nt
ds = − log(t) ≤ 1, (6.3)
that is from t = 1/e onwards. To see that p(t) := P(σt -strategy succeeds) satisfies p(1/e) ≥
1/e, let T (1) denote the arrival time of rank 1 and f (1)(s) the corresponding arrival time density.
Then, by conditioning on T (1),
p(t) =
 1
t
f (1)(s)P

A([t, s[|T (1) = s)

ds, (6.4)
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where A([t, s[) = {no record on [t, s[}. If Ns− ≥ 1 then there exists a best rank among those
arrivals before s so that P(A([t, s[|Ns− > 0)) = t/s, whereas P(A([t, s[|Ns− = 0)) = 1 ≥ t/s.
Hence P(A([t, s[ |T (1) = s)) ≥ s/t . Since f (1) ≡ 1 on [0, 1], (6.4) implies
p(t) ≥
 1
t
(t/s)ds = −t log(t).
Thus p(1/e) ≥ 1/e. Finally, σ1/e fails to stop if and only if T (1) < 1/e, that is with probability
1/e, completing the proof. 
Remark. Unlike in the l.a.p., the p.i.-property does not suffice here to show optimality. We see
from the step (6.2) to (6.3) that the stronger assumption E(Nt/Ns |Ft ) = t/s, t ≤ s, would imply
optimality of the strategy σ1/e. The problem of optimality in general is still open. However, it is a
heartwarming result to see that it is easier to select the best than the last of the arrivals: the lower
bound 1/e of the success probability of getting the best is the upper bound of the probability of
getting the last.
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